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At What Frequency Should the Kelly Bettor Bet?
Chung-Han Hsieh,1 B. Ross Barmish,2 and John A. Gubner3
Abstract—We study the problem of optimizing the
betting frequency in a dynamic game setting using Kelly’s
celebrated expected logarithmic growth criterion as the
performance metric. The game is defined by a sequence of bets
with independent and identically distributed returns X(k).
The bettor selects the fraction of wealth K wagered at k = 0
and waits n steps before updating the bet size. Between
updates, the proceeds from the previous bets remain at risk
in the spirit of “buy and hold.” Within this context, the main
questions we consider are as follows: How does the optimal
performance, we call it g∗
n
, change with n? Does the high-
frequency case, n = 1, always lead to the best performance?
What are the effects of accrued interest and transaction costs?
First, we provide rather complete answers to these questions
for the important special case when X(k) ∈ {−1, 1} is a
Bernoulli random variable with probability p that X(k) = 1.
This serves as an entry point for future research using a
binomial lattice model for stock trading. The latter sections
focus on more general probability distributions for X(k)
and two conjectures. The first conjecture is simple to state:
Absent transaction costs, g∗
n
is non-increasing in n. The
second conjecture involves the technical condition which we
call the sufficient attractiveness inequality. We first prove that
satisfaction of this inequality is sufficient to guarantee that the
low-frequency bettor using large n can match the performance
of the high-frequency bettor using n = 1. Subsequently, we
conjecture, and provide supporting evidence that this condition
is also necessary.
I. INTRODUCTION
The takeoff point for this research is Kelly’s expected loga-
rithmic growth criterion which was originally used as a per-
formance metric in a variety of sequential betting problems;
see [1] and further developments in [2]-[5]. This criterion
is not only fundamental to gambling theory but also a
starting point for a line of research on portfolio optimization
in the stock market; e.g., see [6]-[10]. In addition, within
this body of literature, several desirable properties resulting
from use of the Kelly criterion have been established. Most
notable of these properties are the asymptotic performance
guarantees which are established in some of these papers.
Finally, a sampling of more recent papers on these topics
includes [11]-[15].
To be more specific, the classical Kelly Betting Problem is
described by a sequence of bets with independent and identi-
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cally distributed (i.i.d.) returns X(k) with known probability
distribution. The bettor designates the fraction of wealth K
being wagered seeking to maximize the expected logarithmic
growth of the account value V (k) from k = 0 until the
terminal stage k = N . At intermediate stage k, if the account
value is V (k), and since the bet size is KV (k), the gain or
loss is given by KX(k)V (k), and the updated account value
is therefore
V (k + 1) = (1 +KX(k))V (k).
With this as the backdrop, this paper considers a new version
of Kelly’s problem which involves optimizing the frequency
at which bets are taken. After each bet, a waiting period of n
steps is enforced before updates in the wager occur. Between
updates, the proceeds from the previous bets remain at risk
in the spirit of “buy and hold.”
When the time between bets, call it ∆t, is very small,
this is viewed as the high-frequency case, and when ∆t is
large, this corresponds to “buy and hold.” These two extreme
cases are considered in [11] in the context of portfolio
optimization with returns following a continuous geometric
Brownian motion. In contrast to this work, our objective here
is to analyze, in discrete time, the more general case when
both the probability distribution for the returns and the time
interval ∆t between updates are arbitrary. We consider the
entire range of frequencies — from low to high.
In our new setting described above, the main questions which
we consider are as follows: How does the optimal perfor-
mance, we call it g∗n, change with the waiting period n∆t
between updates? Does the high-frequency case n = 1
always lead to the best performance? What are the effects of
transaction costs? First, we provide rather complete answers
to these questions for the important special case when X(k)
is a Bernoulli random variable corresponding to an even-
money bet with probability p of winning. This can be viewed
as a simple biased coin-flipping game in the spirit of Kelly’s
original work and serves as an entry point for future research
using a binomial lattice model for stock trading. In this part
of the paper, the analysis is also extended to account for
accrued interest on idle cash and transaction costs. Consistent
with intuition, when transaction costs are involved, a low
frequency bettor may do better than a high frequency bettor.
The latter sections of this paper focus on more general
probability distributions for X(k) and two conjectures. The
first conjecture is simple to state: Absent transaction costs, g∗n
is non-increasing in n; i.e., g∗n ≥ g
∗
n+1 for all n. That
is, increasing the frequency of betting can only improve
performance. This raises the following questions: Assuming
the conjecture is true, are the inequalities g∗n ≥ g
∗
n+1
necessarily strict? Might it even be the case that g∗n = g
∗
1
for all n? If so, roughly speaking, this would indicate that
high-frequency betting is a “waste of time.” One might as
well bet at k = 0 once without updating.
The second conjecture bears heavily on the questions above.
To this end we work with the technical condition
E
[
1
1 +X(0)
]
≤ 1.
As explained in the sequel, this inequality is readily in-
terpreted to be an indicator of the “attractiveness” of the
bet. Accordingly, when this inequality is satisfied, the bet
is said to be sufficiently attractive. We first prove that this
condition is in fact sufficient to guarantee g∗n = g
∗
1 for all n.
Then, we conjecture that satisfaction of this inequality is
also a necessary condition. In other words, this inequality
completely characterizes the condition under which there is
no benefit associated with boosting the betting frequency.
Support for this conjecture is provided by the analysis of
the Bernoulli random variable in Section III and numerical
experiments described in Section V.
Kelly Criterion in a Control-Theoretic Setting: Although
our analysis here is carried out without reference to con-
trol theory, it is interesting to note the class of problems
being considered is readily reformulated in the language
of feedback systems. Such a formulation is consistent with
our previous work; e.g., see [14]-[17]. To explain further,
if we introduce the notation I(k) to denote the output of
a controller which determines the “investment” or bet at
each stage, we recognize I(k) = KV (k) as a linear time-
invariant feedback with the gain K being the Kelly fraction.
This control-theoretic set-up is seen in Figure 1. We also
note that this reformulation can be generalized to deal with
the case when X(k) is a vector rather than a scalar; see [14]
and [15]. For the stock market portfolio applications which
we envision in our future work, this will play an important
role.
Fig. 1: Kelly-Style Gambling Feedback Configuration
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Beginning with k = 0, we let X(k) be a sequence of i.i.d.
random variables. We call X(k) the returns and assume that
Xmin ≤ X(k) ≤ Xmax
with Xmin and Xmax being support points satisfying
−1 ≤ Xmin < 0 < Xmax <∞.
Implicit in the inequality −1 ≤ Xmin above is that the bettor
cannot lose more than 100% of the amount bet. Now, for each
integer n ≥ 1 denoting the number of periods between bets,
we define a new random variable
Xn
.
=
n−1∏
k=0
(1 +X(k))− 1
which is induced by the X(k). This new random variable
is the total return which has its own bounds obtained
from Xmin and Xmax. That is,
Xn ≤ (1 +Xmax)
n − 1
.
= Xn,max;
Xn ≥ (1 +Xmin)
n − 1
.
= Xn,min
and it is noted that Xn,min ≥ −1 and Xn,max <∞. In other
words, no matter what waiting period n is used, betting losses
still cannot exceed 100% and betting gains are finite. Now,
for any fixed value of n, we seek to maximize the expected
logarithmic growth
gn(K)
.
=
1
n
E[log(1 +KXn)]
subject to a constraint K ∈ K where K represents the “bet-
ting rules” imposed by the “house” or a broker. In this first
piece of work involving frequency analysis, for simplicity we
take K = [0, 1] in the sequel; see remarks below for further
elaboration. The associated optimal expected logarithmic
growth is now obtained as
g∗n
.
= max
K∈K
g(K)
and any K∗n ∈ K satisfying gn(K
∗
n) = g
∗
n is called
an optimal Kelly fraction. Given that it is trivial to show
that E[X(0)] ≤ 0 leads to K∗n = 0 for all n, that is, no
betting at all as the optimum, without loss of generality, in
the sequel, our standing assumption is that
E[X(0)] > 0.
Remarks: The interpretation of the constraint K = [0, 1]
above is as follows: First, the requirement K ≥ 0 forces
each bet to be non-negative. Roughly speaking this disallows
taking “opposite side” of the bet. For example, if an even-
money coin flip pays off on heads, then K < 0 can be
interpreted as a bet on tails which is disallowed. In the
stock market, this corresponds to “selling short.” The second
inequality associated with K, namely K ≤ 1, is often called
a cash-financing constraint. That is, it forces the bet size to
be no more than the account value V (k). In other words,
this disallows the extension of leverage from the “house”
to the bettor. The paradigm presented in this paper remains
valid for a wide variety of other choices for K. Roughly
speaking, extension of many of the results given here is
accomplished using the notion of “survival” which disallows
any bet that can potentially lead to V (k) < 0. In the next
section, although not highlighted, this survival condition is
implicitly in play when transaction costs are introduced to
the analysis. The reader is referred to [15] for more details
on these more general cases.
Another point to note is that the function gn(K) above can
be readily shown to be concave inK . For the case considered
here with K being a scalar, the numerical maximization
of gn(K) is straightforward whether this function is concave
or not. However, for more general cases when K can be a
vector of weights, concavity plays an important role because
computational tractability may be an issue. The reader is
referred to [14] and [20] for more detailed discussion on this
topic. Finally, it is important to comment on the factor 1/n in
the definition of expected logarithmic growth gn(K) above.
It is needed so that the comparison of performance for
differing values of n is “apples to apples.” Said another way,
since gn(K) is associated with one bet every n periods, we
adjust the expected logarithmic growth to be on a per-period
basis. If we view n as the number of bets per unit of time,
then the betting frequency is given by 1/n.
III. RESULTS FOR BERNOULLI RANDOM VARIABLES
Per discussion in the introduction, we now consider the
motivating case of a simple even-money coin-flipping game.
Consistent with the standing assumption that E[X(0)] > 0,
we assume that p > 1/2 is the probability of heads. Now,
treating the number of steps between bets as variable, the bet-
tor contemplates the possibility of a Kelly-style adjustment
of the bet size every n time steps. Between, adjustments, the
money is allowed to “ride” with resulting profits or losses
carried over into subsequent bets and viewed as “unrealized”
until n coin flips have been executed.
Indeed, since X(k) ∈ {−1, 1} is a Bernoulli random vari-
able, our frequency-dependent method can be carried out in
closed form and our results for g∗n for n > 1 can be compared
with the classical Kelly solution which, for n = 1, is given
byK∗1 = 2p−1 with associated optimal expected logarithmic
growth
g∗1 = p log(2p) + (1− p) log(2− 2p).
The resulting performance, as a function of frequency, is
described in the theorem below.
Theorem 1: For the coin-flipping game with p > 1/2
and even-money payoff described above, the optimal Kelly
fraction is
K∗n =
2npn − 1
2n − 1
and the associated optimal expected logarithmic growth is
given by
g∗n = p
n log p+
(
1− pn
n
)
log
[
1− pn
2n − 1
]
+ log 2.
Proof: We first observe that the total return is given by
Xn = 2
n − 1 with probability pn
and
Xn = −1 with probability 1− p
n.
We now calculate the expected logarithmic growth
gn(K)
.
=
1
n
E [log(1 +KXn)]
=
1
n
[pn log(1 + (2n − 1)K) + (1− pn) log(1−K)]
and find its derivative
∂gn
∂K
=
1
n
[
pn(2n − 1)
1 + (2n − 1)K
−
1− pn
1−K
]
.
Setting this to zero, we obtain a unique candidate for the
maximizer, call it K = K∗n, given by
K∗n =
2npn − 1
2n − 1
which is feasible; i.e., K∗n ∈ [0, 1]. Now using the fact
that gn(K) is concave, in combination with uniqueness of the
zero-derivative point above, it follows that K∗n is the global
maximizer; e.g., see [20]. Finally, to complete our analysis,
we substitute K∗n into gn(K). A lengthy but straightforward
calculation leads to
g∗n = p
n log p+
(
1− pn
n
)
log
[
1− pn
2n − 1
]
+ log 2. 
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Fig. 2: Optimal Expected Logarithmic Growth Versus n
Remarks: To more clearly demonstrate frequency depen-
dence of the performance resulting from the formulae above,
in Figure 2, for various p values, we plot g∗n as a function
of the waiting period n. Noting that g∗n is non-increasing
in n which suggests that betting “faster is better.” In the next
section, we provide conjectures regarding the extent to which
such results are generalizable to more general probability
distributions for the X(k).
IV. TRANSACTION COSTS AND ACCRUED INTEREST
We now indicate how the problem formulation in this paper
is readily extended to include consideration of transaction
costs and accrued interest on idle cash. As far as transaction
costs are concerned, we consider the case when a percentage
charge 0 < ε ≤ 1 is assessed by the “house” each time
the bet is updated. If this occurs at stage k, the charge
is εKV (k). Common sense tells us that as ε increases,
the benefits of high-frequency betting are negated. This is
confirmed in the example to follow. In addition, for the case
of idle cash, let r denote the per-period rate of interest.
With n steps between updates of the bet, the accrued interest
from k = 0 to k = n is (1 + r)n(1 −K − εK)V (0) and it
is natural to anticipate that the optimal fraction K∗n should
decrease as r increases; that is, the incentive to tie up money
in a risky gamble is reduced when a riskless alternative is
available.
For the sake of brevity, we simply summarize how the two
considerations above are handled in an extended formulation.
Suffice it say, the effects of interest and transaction costs
can be “lumped into” the returns. After a straightforward
calculation, we obtain modified expected logarithmic growth
given by
gn(K) = log(1 + r) +
1
n
E[log(1 +KX˜n)]
with
X˜n
.
=
1 + Xn
(1 + r)n
− ε− 1.
In summary, in the high level formulation, whenever conve-
nient, there is no loss of generality taking ε = 0 and r = 0.
Example: Transaction Cost Considerations: To illustrate
how transaction costs negate the performance effects of high-
frequency betting, we revisit the even-money Bernoulli case
considered in the previous section. We now demonstrate
that n = 1 is no longer optimal as the transaction costs grow.
To this end, per discussion above, we now take 0 < ε < 1
to be a percentage transaction cost which is incurred by the
bettor each time the bet size is updated. Note that when
these costs costs are included, the possibility exists that
for K > 1/(1 + ε), the situation V (k) < 0 will arise. To
avoid such ambiguities, in the analysis to follow, we work
with the subset of K where the “survival” issue on K is
involved; i.e., the fraction
K ∈ Kε
.
=
[
0,
1
1 + ε
]
.
Now, to isolate these transaction cost effects, we take interest
rate r = 0 and find K∗n ∈ Kε maximizing the expected
logarithmic growth given by
gn,ε(K) =
1
n
E [ log (1 +K(Xn − ε) )] .
Note that gn,ε(K) is concave in K .
Theorem 2: Consider the coin-flipping game described
above with p > 1/2, even-money payoff, and transaction
cost 0 < ε < 1. Then, with
p ≤ pε
.
=
(
1 + ε
2n
)1/n
,
the optimal Kelly fraction is K∗n,ε = 0 with associated ex-
pected logarithmic growth g∗n,ε = 0. Otherwise, the optimum
is given by
K∗n,ε =
2npn − ε− 1
(ε+ 1) (2n − ε− 1)
with the associated expected logarithmic growth given by
g∗n,ε = p
n log
(
2npn
ε+ 1
)
+ (1− pn) log
(
2n (1− pn)
2n − ε− 1
)
.
Proof: To begin, note that the expected logarithmic growth
for K > 0 is given by
gn,ε(K) = p
n log (1− εK +K (2n − 1))
+ (1− pn) log (1− εK −K) .
Now taking the first derivative and setting it equal to zero,
we obtain a candidate for the optimal Kelly fraction, call
it K = K∗n,ε given above. To complete the proof, we first
show that K∗n,ε ∈ Kε. Indeed, observing that 2
n− ε− 1 > 0
and 1/2 < p ≤ 1, it is straightforward to see that
K∗n,ε ≤
1
1 + ε
.
In addition, for p ≥ pε, we have K
∗
n,ε ≥ 0. Now using
the fact that the zero-derivative point K∗n,ε is unique, in
combination with the fact that gn,ε(K), arguing as in the
proof of Theorem 1, is concave, it follows that K∗n,ε is the
global maximizer. Therefore, substitutingK∗n,ε into gn,ε(K),
a straightforward calculation leads to g∗n,ε as required. 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Number of Steps Between Bets  n
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35gn
*
p = 0.6
p = 0.7
p = 0.8
p = 0.9
Fig. 3: Transaction Cost Effects on g∗
n
Remarks: Note that when ε → 0, we obtain the original
zero-transaction cost result in the previous theorem as a
special case; i.e.,
lim
ε→0
K∗n,ε = lim
ε→0
2npn − 1− ε
(ε+ 1) (2n − ε− 1)
=
2npn − 1
2n − 1
= K∗n.
To illustrate use of the results above, for p = 0.6, 0.7, 0.8
and 0.9 and ε = 0.1, we plot the optimal expected logarith-
mic growth g∗n versus n in Figure 3. From that figure, we see
that the optimal waiting period is n∗ = 2. In other words,
the optimum is achieved by waiting two time units rather
than betting at each step.
V. TWO CONJECTURES AND SUPPORTING EVIDENCE
In this section, we provide two conjectures which are sug-
gested by the results in the previous sections and numerical
experiments. Our first conjecture, roughly speaking, says that
absent transaction costs, betting with higher frequency leads
to better performance. Roughly speaking this says that “faster
is better.” Indeed, this is clearly seen to be true for the
special case involving a simple coin-flipping example. The
conjecture below pertains to the general case formulated in
Section II.
Conjecture 1: The optimal expected logarithmic growth g∗n
is non-increasing in n; i.e., for all n ≥ 1, g∗n ≥ g
∗
n+1.
Supporting Evidence For Conjecture 1: The example
which we now analyze is a generalization of the Bernoulli
random variable scenario in Section III. Indeed, we now
consider a coin-flipping gamble described by
X(k) ∈ {−γ, γ}
with 0 < γ ≤ 1 and p > 1/2. In comparison with our earlier
scenario with γ = 1, the analysis becomes more complicated
for the following reason: With 0 < γ < 1, the total return Xn
no longer has a two-point probability mass function. In this
case, for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n we obtain point masses located at
xi = (1 + γ)
i(1− γ)n−i − 1
with associated probabilities
pi = P (Xn = xi) =
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−i.
This leads to the formula
gn (K) =
1
n
n∑
i=0
pi log (1 +Kxi)
which we maximized numerically with respect
to K ∈ K = [0, 1]. To study the conjecture above, we
carried out the optimization for many values of γ. The
case γ = 1/2, which we now describe, typifies our
findings. To clearly see the difference between the g∗1
and g∗n, we plotted e
∗
n
.
= g∗1 − g
∗
n as a function of p in
Figure 4. Consistent with Conjecture 1, we see g∗n > g
∗
n+1
for p ≤ 0.75.
More interestingly, however, is our observation that
for p ≥ 0.75, the inequality relating g∗n to g
∗
n+1 ceases to be
strict. That is, once the bet becomes “sufficiently attractive,”
there does not appear to be any benefit associated with high-
frequency betting. For example, the expected logarithmic
growth betting every ten steps is the same as what one
obtains betting every step. This observation paves the way for
our second conjecture which bears on the following roughly-
stated question: Under what conditions is increasing the bet-
ting frequency a waste of time? To address this issue a tech-
nical condition, which we call the sufficient attractiveness
inequality, is now introduced.
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Fig. 4: Plot of Error e∗
n
Versus p
Definition: The i.i.d. random variables X(k) are said to
satisfy the sufficient attractiveness inequality if
E
[
1
1 +X (0)
]
≤ 1.
Remarks: The use of the descriptor “sufficient attractive-
ness” above is consistent with our experience with a wide
variety of examples which indicates the following: This
inequality tends to be satisfied when the gamble becomes
highly favorable to the bettor. As a first illustration, for the
extreme case with X(0) > 0 with probability one, we have
an arbitrage, and the sufficient attractiveness inequality above
is trivially satisfied. Indeed, we now argue that the smallness
of E[1/(1 +X(0))] is desirable. To establish this, put
θ
.
= E
[
1
1 +X(0)
]
.
Then, since f(z) = 1/(1+z) is convex, applying the Jensen’s
inequality leads to
1
1 + E [X(0)]
≤ E
[
1
1 +X(0)
]
,
which, for 0 < θ ≤ 1 implies that
E[X(0)] ≥
1
θ
− 1.
This inequality tells us that as θ decreases to zero, E[X(0)]
increases without bound. In other words, smallness of
E[1/(1+X(0))] is desirable. The inequality also tell us that
sufficient attractiveness implies E[X(0)] ≥ 0.
More realistically, for the case considered in the previous
section with X(k) = γ with probability p and X(k) = −γ
with probability 1− p, it is easy to verify that the sufficient
attractiveness inequality is satisfied if and only if
p ≥
1 + γ
2
.
For example, for the even-money payoff with γ = 1/2, we
require p ≥ 0.75. Note that for the extreme case γ = 1,
we require p = 1 and all g∗n are equal. More gener-
ally, for Bernoulli problems with X(k) ∈ {Xmin, Xmax}
and P (X(k) = Xmax) = p, the sufficient attractiveness
inequality reduces to
p ≥
|Xmin| (1 +Xmax)
Xmax −Xmin
.
This tells us that the winning probability p should be higher
than some threshold in order for the bet to be recognized
as sufficiently attractive. Below we provide a result which
serves as a feeder for our next conjecture.
Sufficient Attractiveness for Uniform Distribution: We
now provide more detail for the case of the uniform dis-
tribution. This example is interesting because the sufficient
attractiveness inequality can be analyzed in closed form.
Suppose the i.i.d. returns X(k) are governed by the uniform
distribution on [a, b] with −1 < a < 0 and b > 0. To first
study the sufficient attractiveness inequality, we calculate
E
[
1
1 +X(0)
]
=
1
b− a
log
(
1 + b
1 + a
)
.
Now, for a in its allowed range, we define
bmin(a) = min
{
b > 0 : E
[
1
1 +X (0)
]
≤ 1
}
.
Note that the sufficient attractiveness inequality for the
uniform distribution case is easily seen to be equivalent to
ea
1 + a
≤
eb
1 + b
.
If we put f(t) = et/(1 + t), then the inequality above
says f(a) ≤ f(b). Since −1 < a < 0 < b is as-
sumed in the uniform case, the bet is sufficiently at-
tractive if and only if b ≥ bmin(a), where bmin(a) > 0
solves f(b) = f(a), which is easily accomplished in Matlab.
A formula for bmin(a) is provided in the remark below.
Remarks: The description of bmin(a) above can also be
given in terms of the Lambert function. Namely,
bmin(a) = −1−W
−1
(
− (1 + a) e−(1+a)
)
where W
−1
(·) is the Lambert function with lower branch
satisfyingW
−1
(·) ≤ −1. Figure 5 provides a plot for bmin(a)
versus |a| for a ∈ (−1, 0). Note that as a decreases, the
figure tells us what value of b is needed to sustain sufficient
attractiveness.
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Fig. 5: Sufficient Attractiveness: bmin(a) Versus |a|
Sufficiency Theorem: Satisfaction of the sufficient attrac-
tiveness inequality guarantees that the condition g∗1 = g
∗
n
holds for all n ≥ 1.
Proof: Assuming that the sufficient attractiveness inequality
holds, we first claim that gn(K) is nondecreasing. Beginning
with
d
dK
gn(K) =
d
dK
E [log(1 +KXn)]
and noting that Xn is bounded, results in probability theory,
for example, see [18] and [19], allow us to commute the
differentiation and expectation operators above. Hence,
d
dK
E [log(1 +KXn)] = E
[
d
dK
log(1 +KXn)
]
= E
[
Xn
1 +KXn
]
.
Now noting that the inequality
z
1 +Kz
≥ 1−
1
1 + z
holds for all K ∈ [0, 1] and all z > −1, we obtain
d
dK
E [log(1 +KXn)] ≥ 1− E
[
1
1 + Xn
]
.
Using the fact that the X(k) are i.i.d., we observe that
E
[
1
1 + Xn
]
= E
[
n−1∏
k=0
1
1 +X (k)
]
=
(
E
[
1
1 +X (0)
])n
≤ 1.
Now combining this with the previous inequality, we have
d
dK
gn(K) ≥ 0
which shows that gn(K) is non-decreasing in K .
Hence gn(K) is maximized at K = 1. Therefore, for all n,
we have g∗n = gn (1). It only remains to observe that
gn (1) =
1
n
E[log (1 + Xn)]
=
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
E[log (1 +X (k))]
= E[log (1 +X (0))]
= g∗1
which completes the proof. 
Remarks: The Sufficiency Theorem tells us that when a bet
is attractive enough, the buy-and-hold bettor can achieve the
same betting performance as the high-frequency bettor. It is
also worth mentioning that the degenerate case E[X(0)] = 0,
not covered by our initial assumptions, is easily shown to
lead to all g∗n = 0 too; i.e., the optimum is K
∗
n = 0 which
corresponds to no betting.
Conjecture 2: Satisfaction of the sufficient attractiveness
inequality is necessary for the condition g∗1 = g
∗
n to hold
for all n ≥ 1.
Supporting Evidence for Conjecture 2: It is first noted
that we carried out a number of preliminary numerical
experiments with results which support the conjecture for
commonly used distributions such as Bernoulli, uniform,
triangular, beta and truncated normal. That is, with the
sufficient attractiveness inequality satisfied, for many cases,
we carried out the required optimizations to find the g∗n. To
numerical accuracy we found g∗n ≈ g
∗
1 for the ranges of n
which we considered.To provide further supporting evidence
for the conjectured necessity of sufficient attractiveness,
observe in Figure 4 that for p ≥ 0.75, we have g∗n = g
∗
1
for n = 2, 5, and 10. For the uniform distribution case,
although not shown in the figure, our numerical experiments
also show that g∗n = g
∗
1 for n ≤ 20.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we studied the problem of optimizing the bet-
ting frequency in a dynamic setting using Kelly’s celebrated
expected logarithmic growth criterion as the performance
metric. We provided a detailed analysis for the important
special case when X(k) is a Bernoulli random variable
with even-money payoff. We also extended our analysis to
include accrued interest on idle cash and transaction costs.
The results for the Bernoulli case support our first conjecture
that the optimal expected logarithmic growth g∗n is a non-
increasing in n.
We also investigated conditions under which betting with
arbitrarily low frequency can still achieve the same per-
formance as betting with very high-frequency. To this end,
we showed that satisfaction of the sufficient attractiveness
inequality assures that g∗n = g
∗
1 for all n. Subsequently, we
conjectured that the sufficient attractiveness is also necessary
and provided numerical evidence in support.
Regarding further research, one obvious continuation would
be to study the two conjectures in greater detail. Another
problem for future research involves extension of the results
in this paper to a portfolio scenario with many correlated
random variables; i.e., we take X(k) to be a vector rather
than the scalar considered here. For this more general case
with K being a vector of weights, we envision concave
programming playing an important role since computational
tractability can become a significant issue when multi-
dimensional optimization is performed.
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